Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas by Hollander, Abraham & MACDISSI, Charbel
Cahier 2003-02
HOLLANDER, Abraham
MACDISSI, Charbel
Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports
are Restricted by Quotas
Département de sciences économiques 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville 
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7 
Canada 
http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca  
SCECO-information@UMontreal.CA 
Téléphone : (514) 343-6539 
Télécopieur : (514) 343-7221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0709-9231 
  
 
 
 
 
Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas  
 
 
by 
 
 
      
Abraham Hollander 
University of Montreal 
Centre for Transportation Research 
 
and 
 
Charbel Macdissi 
U.F.R. des Sciences Juridiques et Économiques de la Guadeloupe 
                                             Université des Antilles-Guyane 
                           Centre d’Études et de Documentation Européenne 
 
 
February 2003 
 
 
 
Abstract: A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price 
discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This 
causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports 
below the free trade level.  
 
 
JEL classification: F12, F13 
Keywords: quota, monopoly, discrimination, dominance, dynamic.  
 
 
 
 
Correspondence should be addressed to : Abraham Hollander, Department of Economics, 
University of Montreal, POB 6128, Station “ Centre-Ville”, Montreal, QC, H3C 3J7, 
Canada. Phone (514) 343 7214, Fax (514) 343 7221, e-mail : 
hollande@poste.umontreal.ca 
 
 1 
 
Introduction 
A extensive literature focuses on the welfare effects of import quotas under imperfect 
competition. The most basic finding is that under monopoly quota restrictions are more 
costly from a welfare perspective than tariffs. One reason is that quotas, unlike tariffs, do 
not set a ceiling on the domestic price.1 Another reason is that monopolistic firms may 
underutilize quota that a competitive sector would utilize fully.2  Also, in an oligopolistic 
environment imposition of a quota may raise prices and profits by acting as facilitating 
practice- i.e., a practice that facilitates collusion.3     
 
A feature common to all this literature is that conclusions are drawn from one-period 
models. Such framework rules out the possibility that quota unused in one period will be 
exploited in a subsequent period. For that reason, these models cannot address the 
question how monopoly compares to competition in terms of the choice of a time path of 
quota utilization. This requires a dynamic model.  
 
The literature on quotas in a dynamic context is still sparse. Anderson (1987) and  
Krishna and Tan (1996) explore time paths of quota uses and prices when quota value 
changes over time due to random shocks. Quota holders postpone the utilization of quota 
when expected future quota value exceeds current value. However, these papers do not 
consider the role of market. A paper which does, is Miyagiwa and Ohno( 2001). It  
examines the time path of quota utilisation in a stationary market where a domestic 
                                                 
The authors thank H. Bowen, L Dudley and J-M Viaene for their comments and suggestions. 
1 see Bhagwati (1965, 1968) for the case of domestic monopoly and Shibata(1968) for a foreign monopoly. 
2 In fact, a monopoly may purchase more quota that it actually uses. See Hillman et al. ( 1980) 
3 Harris ( 1985) and Krishna (1992) 
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producer faces a quota-constrained importer. They show that when future profits are not 
discounted too heavily, imports increase within the time interval in which the import 
license remains valid. This occurs because the quota serves as a mechanism that 
facilitates a more collusive outcome.  
 
What motivates this paper is the complaint articulated by an Ecuadorian official that 
firms holding the lion’s share of the import quota to selected agricultural products have 
“this deplorable penchant” to flood the market with “excessive amounts” of foreign 
product at times when home growers harvest the domestically grown substitute. This 
results in a lower local price during harvesting season - an effect the official attributes to 
growers’ inability to store the harvested product. Because growers base their forecast of 
future prices on past prices, there also ensues a reduction in domestic production. Quota 
holders are few and imports often account for a very substantial share of local 
consumption. 
 
This paper gives formal meaning to the expression“ excessive imports”. It explores 
whether the alleged behaviour is rational on the part of a dominant importer. It does so in 
the framework of a parsimoniously specified 2-period. It finds that profit maximization 
does indeed give rise to excessive imports during harvesting season, showing that for a 
given amount of cumulative imports, strategic behaviour by the importer reduces welfare. 
The importer engages in inter-temporal price discrimination. The welfare loss results 
from a lowering of cumulative consumption and from the misallocation of imports across 
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periods. The paper also explores whether a similar result obtains when import licenses are 
sold rather than given away for free.  
 
2. The model 
 
There is a two-period production-consumption cycle with periods labelled 1 and 2. 
Consumer demand for the homogeneous good is met through imports and domestic 
supply . Imports can enter the country in each period. Domestic supply originates from a 
competitive fringe of firms producing only in period 1.  
 
The good cannot be stored. Therefore, the quantities consumed in the two periods are 
1qS +  and 2q , where iq  denotes imports in period i  { }[ ]2,1=i and S denotes supply by 
the fringe. Because storage is impossible, domestic supply responds only to the price of 
period 1.  
  
The inverse demands are  
 
  [ ]111 )( qpSDp +=           (1) 
and   [ ]22 qDp =           (2) 
where ip denotes the price prevailing in period .i Also, 0'<D  and .0'>S  The sum of 
imports in period 1 and 2 – called cumulative imports- is limited by the quota Q which is 
sufficiently restrictive to ensure that  
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Qqq =+ 21            (3) 
 
Conditions (1)-(3) imply that the optimal allocation of imports across periods satisfies  
   
[ ] [ ]***)(* 21 qDqpSDp =+=        (4) 
 
subject to (3). This requires **)( 1qpS + = *2q . 
 
The allocation given by (4) obtains when importers are price takers in the product market. 
This allocation is set against the allocation chosen by a single firm that holds all the 
import licenses. That firm is assumed to be a dominant player in the sense of being a first 
mover.4  
 
The dominant firm utilizes quota to maximize 2211 qpqp + .This requires equalization of 
marginal revenues across periods .5 Specifically, it requires that 
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where dq1 +
dq2  =Q and, [ ]ddd qpSDp 111 )( += 6.  
 
                                                 
4 This is the classical textbook model of the dominant firm facing a competitive fringe. The dominant firm 
is assumed to repeat the same strategy over infinite number of cycles. 
5 The assumption of a zero price for imports simplifies notation but does not affect any result. 
6 To derive (4) use has been made of (1) to obtain )''1('11 SDDdqdp −=  
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Using (4), *1q < *2q  and 1')'1( >− SD , it is straightforward to show that welfare 
maximizing requires that the importer’s marginal in period 1 be larger than in period 2. 
Formally,  
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The implication is *11 qq
d >  and *22 qq
d < 7. Thus, the dominant firm imports more than a 
competitive import sector would during the period when which domestic production 
takes place. There are two reasons: First, for any quantities 21 qqS =+ , the derived demand 
is less steep than the demand in period 2. 8 Second, *2*1 qq < .  
 
The inability to store allows the importer to act like a monopoly engaged in third degree 
price discrimination. However, the welfare implications are different. Under standard 
third degree price discrimination, welfare could be higher or lower than under uniform 
pricing. The reason is that the welfare gain from an increase in output could outweigh the 
loss resulting from the creation of a price wedge across markets.9. There is no such trade-
off here. Because the dominant firm imports a larger quantity in period 1 than under 
uniform pricing, p1 is lower than price under uniform pricing.
10 Therefore domestic 
                                                 
7 This conclusion hinges on marginal revenue being decreasing in quantity. This follows from the second 
order condition. 
8 This follows from ')'1('' SDDD −< . 
9 see Tirole (1988) 
10 If the period immediately following the grant of quota is the harvesting period, then discounting future 
earnings  would yield and even lower p1. The reason is that the dominant importer would equalize marginal 
revenue from period 1 imports with the discounted marginal revenue from period 2 imports. Discounting 
would have the opposite effect if the importer acquired the quota at the beginning of period 2.  
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supply is also lower. Thus, cumulative consumption is also lower than under uniform 
pricing. Clearly, the reduction in local production magnifies the welfare loss caused by 
the inter-temporal price gap.  
 
3. A graphical illustration  
 
Figure 1 displays consumer demands for periods 1 and 2 as well as the fringe supply, the 
period 1 derived demand and, marginal revenues. 
 
Insert figure 1. 
 
The import quota is shown as the distance between E and Z. Efficient allocation has with 
imports equal to HZ in period 1 and EH in period 2. The corresponding price is p.  When 
the quota is held by a single firm, period 1 imports are TG  and period 2 imports are FT 
(TG=VN).  Prices are p1 and p2.  Compared to uniform pricing, there is a loss in period 2 
consumer surplus equal to the area RSHE and a gain in period 1 equal to the area 
HMNK.11 Producers’ loss in surplus is the area. HBVK. Discrimination increases the 
value of the quota by the area SRHU minus the area HJIK. The latter is as large as  
VYXN. Therefore, the total welfare loss due to discrimination is the sum YBV+( 
MXN+SEU). Its first component is the loss due to lower production; the second 
component is the a loss attributable to the misallocation of consumption. 
 
                                                 
11 It is obvious that cumulative consumer surplus is lower than under uniform pricing. Because the 
cumulative quantity is smaller than under uniform pricing, consumer surplus is lower than when the price is 
p even if the smaller quantity were sold at non-discriminatory prices.  
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4.Final remarks 
 
In the presence of seasonal production by fringe producers, allocation of import licenses 
to a single importer causes welfare to fall due to inter-temporal discriminatory pricing, 
although quota is fully utilized.  
 
This result does not hinge on the assumption that all quota is held by a single firm. The 
outcome would the same in qualitative terms, if quota were held by a small import 
oligopoly. However, welfare losses would be smaller than under a single importer 
because the gap between demand and “perceived” marginal revenue would be smaller. 
 
A government that auctions quota could, in principle, maximize revenue by selling all 
licenses to a single importer. This, however requires that all licenses be offered on an all-
or-nothing basis to the highest bidder.12 A sale of a quota in small lots bars the type of 
discrimination shown in this model. The reason is simple. Consider e.g., the last lot 
offered for sale and assume that all previously sold lots have been acquired by a one firm. 
The maximum amount that such firm would pay for the last lot is the contribution to 
marginal revenue; the maximum amount an outsider would pay is the price prevailing in 
the period when there is no production. Because price in that period exceeds marginal 
revenue, an outsider can outbid the large importer. The same reasoning applies equally to 
the second-to-the-last lot, the third-to-the-last lost, etc.. The implication is that welfare 
                                                 
12 Whether or not doing so actually maximizes revenue depends on the number of firms that would bid for 
the entire quota. When the number of bidders increases as lot sizes fall, revenue maximization may require 
that the amount of quota be sliced up and that slices be auctioned separately.  
 8 
losses shown in the paper hinge crucially on quota being given freely to a small number 
of importers or, being auctioned in large lots. 
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